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OPTING IN AND OUT OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
IN COOPERATIVE VENTURES:
REFINING THE SO-CALLED
COASEAN CONTRACT
THEORY
CHARLES ROGERS O'KELLEY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Johnston's provocative article' explores a familiar problem
in the law of closely held business associations-the alleged exploitation
of weaker or minority investors by stronger or majority participants.
The fact pattern is simple. At the outset of the cooperative venture, a
stronger participant assumes the role of proprietor, partner, or majority
shareholder, while a weaker participant assumes the role of agent, part-
ner, or minority shareholder. For whatever reason, the venturers do not
explicitly guarantee or protect the weaker participant's right to income
or continued participation in the venture. Consequently, at some later
date the stronger participant reduces or eliminates the weaker investor's
participation in or return from the cooperative venture. The weaker in-
vestor then seeks equitable relief, claiming that the stronger venturer's
actions violate the implied fiduciary duties owed to the weaker
participant.
Under what Johnston calls the Coasean Contract Theory,2 courts
should resolve such post-harmony disputes in cooperative ventures by
providing the specific result the parties would have wanted had they been
able to contract for an explicit solution.3 Johnston identifies two
problems with the Coasean Contract Theory as currently interpreted.
First, Coasean theorists have incorrectly concluded that a broad, implied
fiduciary duty would be economically inefficient as a general proposi-
* Professor of Law, University of Oregon.
1 Jason Scott Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties In Cooper-
ative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291 (1992).
2. The Coasean Contract Theory derives its name and its substance from two seminal works
by R. H. Coase. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937); R.H.
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. EcON. 1 (1960).
3. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 293-94; Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 624 (1990).
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tion.4 Second, the current theory inadequately accounts for strategic in-
centives in bargaining around the law.5 In addressing these defects,
Professor Johnston attempts to develop a more accurate account of how
Coasean judges can determine what parties would have wanted in the
way of implied fiduciary duties when the parties have not bargained for
explicit fiduciary-like protection.
In Parts II and III of my Comment, I argue that (1) Johnston's pro-
posed revision of the Coasean Contract Theory is inconsistent with both
the portions of current theory that he accepts and with his own assump-
tions as to venturers' rationality; and (2) as a result, he has misinter-
preted the views of Coasean Contract Theory proponents. I also argue
that Johnston's arguments reveal a gap-filling theory more appropriate to
discrete transactions between strangers than to long-term, relational con-
tracts.6 In the process, I hope to shed some light on how efficiency-
minded judges7 should apply the Coasean Contract Theory, and, thus,
some light on the theory itself.
II. THE SIGNALLING FUNCTION PERFORMED BY INITIAL
FORM SELECTION
A central insight of transaction-cost economists, embedded in the so-
4. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 295-98.
5. See id.
6. Almost all contracts have relational elements. Nonetheless, it is important to differentiate
between short-term contracts with little relational content, sometimes called discrete contracts, and
long-term contracts or firms that are highly relational. This distinction is captured by Ian R. Mac-
neil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974):
The gas purchase is a [discrete] transactional event in the sense that, except for the expecta-
tion of the driver that the station would have gasoline available and the expectation of the
station that any driver stopping would have some means of paying, the exchange has no
past. There are no precedent relations between the parties. Nor will there be any future
relations between the parties. As to the present, two general characteristics dominate the
transaction: it is short; it is limited in scope. A few minutes measure its duration, and no
one, even the most gregarious, enters into anything approaching a total human relationship
in such a situation. In such a transaction the measured exchange, gallons/dollars, is what
matters.... Contrast this service station stop with a traditional marriage relation. The
latter consists not of a series of discrete transactions, but of what happened before (often
long before), of what is happening now ("now" itself often being a very extended period),
and of what is expected (in large measure only in the vaguest of ways) to happen in the
future. These continually form the relation without a high degree of consciousness of mea-
sured transactions.
Id. at 720-21.
7. "Efficiency-minded judges" make their decisions based on efficiency considerations. The
first similar published usage of the modifier "efficiency-minded" of which I am aware occurred in Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92 (1989).
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called Coasean Contract Theory, is that rational prospective venturers
engage in a comparative ex ante search for the best investment opportu-
nity, which includes a search for the best governance structure. Before
rational investors will enter into a prospective venture, this search must
proceed through three not necessarily discrete steps. First, each investor
must conclude that the prospective venture promises a better return on
her human and money capital than do alternative investment opportuni-
ties. Second, the investors must agree upon the organizational form that
offers the optimal balance between adaptability to changed circumstances
and opportunism. The obvious candidates are spot contracting, long-
term contracting, sole proprietorship, partnership, limited-liability com-
pany, and corporation. Finally, if the organizational form chosen is a
partnership, corporation, sole proprietorship, or limited-liability com-
pany, the parties must decide whether explicit contractual modifications
to the state-provided default rules will maximize value.8
Critical to Johnston's analysis is the assumption that participants are
extremely rational and that they are able to understand the relative ad-
vantages and opportunistic risks attendant to extending fiduciary protec-
tion to the weaker venturer.9 Given this degree of rationality, the
Coasean Contract Theory presumes that prospective venturers will
choose organizational form while taking into account both the adaptive
advantages and opportunistic risks of the form chosen.1" These adaptive
8. For a more detailed account of this comparative ex ante search for best investment best
governance structure, see CHARLES ROGERS O'KELLEY & ROBERT THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS AsSOCIATIoNS, (forthcoming 1992) (Chapter One, Part B). For a coherent
description of the transaction-cost factors underlying the comparative search for best investment, see
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-84 (1985).
9. Johnston's "model assumes extremely rational parties whose bargains account for the in-
centives that the duty of good faith creates." Johnston, supra note 1, at 329.
10. The trade-off between adaptability and risk of opportunism is not uniform among govern-
ance structures. Thus, rational investors search for the structure offering the optimal balance. Oli-
ver Williamson makes this point succinctly.
Many of the interesting issues with which transaction cost economics is involved reduce
to an assessment of adaptive, sequential decision-making. Contingent on the set of transac-
tions to be effected, the basic proposition... is that governance structures differ in their
capacities to respond effectively to disturbances. To be sure, those issues would vanish
were it not for bounded rationality, since then it would be feasible to develop a detailed
strategy for crossing all possible bridges in advance. It would likewise be possible to adapt
effectively [pursuant to agreed upon general rules] were it not for opportunism. Con-
fronted, however, by the need to cope with both bounded rationality and opportunism,
comparative institutional assessments of the adaptive attributes of alternative governance
structures must necessarily be made.
WILLIAMSON, supra note 8, at 56-57.
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advantages and opportunistic risks are widely and easily understood.11
Proprietorship form gives minimal protection to at-will employees, but
maximum adaptability and freedom from opportunism to the proprietor.
Corporate form also gives minimal protection to minority shareholders'
employment expectations, but gives greater equitable protection, via fidu-
ciary duty and involuntary dissolution proceedings, to a minority share-
holder's nonhuman-capital investment expectations. However, the
protection provided to minority shareholders comes at the expense of the
adaptability and freedom from minority opportunism that sole proprie-
torship form would give the stronger participant. Partnership-at-will
form gives the greatest protection to weaker participants' nonhuman-
capital expectations, via dissolution-at-will and fiduciary duty. Again,
this greater protection for the weaker participant comes at the expense of
the adaptability and freedom from minority opportunism that the
stronger participant could expect if the firm were organized as a sole
proprietorship or corporation.
Given this picture of how rational stronger and weaker venturers
choose investment form, how would courts who follow the Coasean Con-
tract Theory decide whether to grant fiduciary duty protection to a
weaker participant when the venturers did not bargain for an explicit
rule covering the matter in dispute? Under the Coasean Contract The-
ory, as I interpret it, the answer is simple. If the state provides sufficient
standard forms 2 and if the parties are presumed rational enough to have
appreciated the relative adaptability and exposure to opportunism that
11. It is unclear whether Professor Johnston would agree with this statement because he makes
the following somewhat puzzling assertion.
[Miany general partners . . do not bargain with an acute awareness of the incentive
effects of the implied duty of good faith. If this assumption is warranted, then efficiency
has nothing to say about the implication of the duty of good faith. Parties who are com-
pletely unaware of legal rules cannot be affected by legal rules."
Johnston, supra note 1, at 330 (emphasis added). Professor Johnston appears to assert that ventur-
ers who choose partnership form often do so without understanding the adaptive characteristics and
relative opportunistic risks posed by that governance structure. Clearly, empirical evidence is unsat-
isfactory on this issue. See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 425, 431 (1987). Nonetheless, it is commonly assumed that venturers choose organizational
form aware of the corresponding tax benefits or limited liability rules. Why, then, should such
investors also not have, or obtain via expert advice, at least a general understanding of the adaptive
rules and opportunistic risks posed by the standard-form governance structures?
12. For a thoughtful discussion of both the advantages and shortcomings offered by widely
suitable, state-provided, standard-form governance structures, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
[Vol. 70:353
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such forms offer, then the Coasean judge provides weaker participants
with the level of implied fiduciary protection common to the form cho-
sen. For example, in typical close corporation cases, the Coasean judge
considers extending equitable relief to the complaining minority share-
holder, but such relief is not automatically granted or fashioned after
partnership law's dissolution-at-will provisions.13 Instead, the court
places some burden of proof or persuasion on the complaining minority
shareholder to preserve both the balance between adaptability and oppor-
tunism and the amount of majority discretion for which the parties, being
rational, presumably bargained.14
Two circumstances make the Coasean judge's task more difficult.
First, if the available standard forms are insufficient, and if transaction
costs are relatively high, the Coasean judge may conclude that a form
was chosen for tax or liability rules, and that, but for transaction costs,
an entirely different governance form would have been selected.15 Sec-
ond, if the participants in a cooperative venture are not sufficiently ra-
tional or informed to appreciate the relative balance between adaptability
and opportunism that a particular standard form presents, a Coasean
judge may conclude that the parties did not in fact contract for the nor-
mal rules attendant to the form that they chose.16
Professor Johnston rejects this model. He argues that courts should
13. Some commentators have argued that close corporations are analogous to general partner-
ships and, therefore, dissatisfied minority shareholders should have an absolute right to have their
shares repurchased by the majority investors. See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, li-
quidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem,
63 VA. L. REv. 1 (1977). Such a norm would fundamentally change corporate form. However, no
state has adopted such a rule, either legislatively or judicially. For criticism of this proposal, see
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV.
271, 286-90, 297-300 (1986).
14. In other words, it is wrong to criticize the outcome of a particular close corporation case
simply because the minority carried her burden of proof. It would be appropriate to criticize the
result if the minority were required to carry no burden at all.
15. The Limited Liability Company is a business form that offers investors the limited liability
rules common to corporate form, the tax treatment common to partnership form, and governance
norms similar to those found in general partnership law. This form was adopted by Wyoming in
1977, by Florida in 1982, by six additional states in 1990 and 1991, and is being considered in a
number of other states. Once this form is generally available, it should be less necessary for rational
investors to forgo partnership governance rules to receive the tax and liability treatment desired.
16. This presents a dilemma for the Coasean judge. By attempting to second guess the parties'
form selection, she may make mistakes and take away the very result for which the parties did in fact
bargain. These errors will devalue the form. Thus, efficiency-minded judges must weigh the poten-
tial gains from correcting for irrational form selection against the costs in form devaluation resulting
from such erroneous second guessing.
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not imply and enforce limits on opportunistic action by stronger ventur-
ers unless two conditions are satisfied.17 First, the fiduciary duty sought
must be efficient.'" In other words, the judge must conclude that the
specific rule that she fashions ex post would have drawn forth greater
team-specific investment if explicitly agreed to ex ante.19 Second, the risk
of opportunistic misuse of such duty must be so great that no nonoppor-
tunistic stronger venturer would have agreed to it ex ante.20 Implicitly,
Johnston argues that courts need not consider why rational investors
would have chosen a particular business form at the outset.
Since Professor Johnston constructs his model by analyzing how hypo-
thetical rational investors would decide whether to opt in or out of fiduci-
ary duty, why he ignores the signalling effect of initial form selection is
puzzling. This puzzle increases when we recall Johnston's use of ex-
tremely rational investors in his analysis.2' For if, as Johnston hypothe-
sizes, investors are rational and informed enough to appreciate the
opportunistic risks fiduciary duties create, surely they are also rational
and informed enough to choose an organizational form that does not
expose them to that risk, or to tailor the chosen form to eliminate that
risk.
For example, suppose that a stronger prospective venturer, Jane, in-
sists on maximum adaptability and minimal exposure to an opportunistic
use of fiduciary duty, and that the weaker prospective venturer, Barry,
agrees to invest on those terms. Proponents of the Coasean Contract
Theory would expect such venturers to organize as a sole proprietorship
with the weaker party as an at-will employee, or as a corporation with
the minority shareholder explicitly agreeing that his employment is ter-
minable at will and that the corporation can repurchase his shares in the
17. Johnston, supra note 1, at 327-28.
18. Fiduciary duty is efficient if its inclusion will "increase[] the total expected surplus from
cooperation." Id. at 299.
19. For example, in In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980), the rule might be de-
scribed as follows: If you relocate and invest your life savings in this venture, and if you perform
your end of the bargain in terms of setting up the pharmacy and getting it going, and if we terminate
you with or without cause prior to your realizing the benefits of an extended relation with the ven-
ture, then we will either repurchase your shares at their then fair market value or dissolve the
corporation.
20. Johnston, supra note 1, at 328. An efficient term "protects against exploitation and there-
fore encourages firm-specific investment by trustworthy or minority shareholder/managers... [but]
includ[ing] such a duty also threatens to redistribute surplus from entrepreneur/majority sharehold-
ers to opportunistic minority shareholder/managers." Id. at 299.
21. Id. at 329.
[Vol. 70:353
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss2/5
REFINING COASEAN CONTRACT THEORY
event of such termination.22
Suppose Jane and Barry do organize their venture as a sole proprietor-
ship, with Jane becoming the proprietor and Barry an employee. Fur-
thermore, suppose it will be impossible for a court to determine ex post
whether Jane and Barry actually intended to grant Jane the adaptability
and freedom from fiduciary duty restraints contract and tort law nor-
mally affords proprietors. Finally, suppose that shortly after the venture
commences, Jane discharges Barry without cause.
If Barry, the weaker venturer, seeks judicial relief on the grounds that
Jane owes him expansive fiduciary duties, how should an efficiency-
minded court rule? Johnston argues that the court should imply expan-
sive fiduciary duties if it concludes that such fiduciary duty would be
efficient-that is, would have drawn forth more team-specific investment
if expressly provided ex ante.23 As I interpret the Coasean Contract The-
ory, an efficiency-minded court would not engage in such inquiry because
the organizational form the venturers chose, as modified by any express
agreement, is the best possible indicator of how much fiduciary protec-
tion they desired.24
As presently cast, Johnston's arguments assume that venturers adopt
an organizational form and then must either opt in or opt out of fiduciary
duty restraints on the stronger venturer, depending on what the form
provides as a starting point. 25 However, it is far more common in the
closely held setting for venturers to negotiate from an initial position of
no agreement at all. Professor Johnston's model assumes that venturers
face a simple choice-either stay with the fiduciary rules that the chosen
form provides, if any, or opt for an alternative rule. In the more typical
case, the venturers must decide whether to enter into the venture at all,
and if so, which organizational form and attendant level of fiduciary duty
to adopt.26 Professor Johnston must address this more complex situation
22. Coaseans would not expect to see such ventures organized as at-will partnerships, because
the choice of such form would allow the weaker partner to use both dissolution and fiduciary duty
opportunistically.
23. Johnston, supra note 1, at 330-33.
24. Once a Coasean court concludes that the parties most likely preferred a certain level of
fiduciary protection, it is axiomatic that the court will not grant a greater level of protection. To
grant greater relief would be inefficient-that is, would reduce the value of prospective similarly
situated investments. If such greater relief were granted, then future similarly situated investors
must either bear the expense of opting out of the unwanted fiduciary duty implied by the court or
must forgo the venture entirely.
25. Johnston, supra note 1, at 300.
26. In other words, in the typical case prospective venturers face two related opt in choices-
1992]
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if he is to convince us of the role that strategic bargaining incentives play
in initial form selection and of how efficiency-minded courts should take
that knowledge into account.
III. GAP FILLING IN THE RELATIONAL CONTRACT SETTING
Early in his article, Professor Johnston notes that "deciding whether
or not there is a gap in the contract is neither simple nor necessarily
distinct from answering the next question, which is how to fill the gap."27
This unclarity as to the difference between identifying a gap and deciding
how to fill a gap permeates Johnston's paper. Accordingly, I now ex-
plain (1) the difference between identifying and filling a gap; and (2) the
relationship between the Coasean Contract Theory, as I interpret it, and
the gap-filling task closely held, relational ventures present. I illustrate
these points by reference to the well-known partnership case, Page v.
Page,2" which Professor Johnston discussed extensively in his paper.29
In Page the partners entered into an oral partnership to operate a laun-
dry business. Each contributed capital. The stronger partner served as
managing partner, and through a separate corporation supplied linens
and machinery to the partnership. After eight years of operation the
partnership had suffered total losses of sixty-two thousand dollars and
owed the stronger partner's corporation forty-seven thousand dollars.
Upon the establishment of Vandenberg Air Force base in the laundry's
vicinity, the partnership's business began to prosper. Despite, or perhaps
because of, this change of fortune, the stronger partner apparently indi-
cated his desire to dissolve the partnership. Fearing the consequences of
dissolution, the weaker partner sought declaratory relief. The trial court
held that the partnership was for an implied durational term extending
until partnership debts were repaid out of profits and, thus, any prema-
ture dissolution would be wrongful.
The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that the weaker
partner had "failed to prove any facts from which an agreement to con-
tinue the partnership for a term may be implied."3 But the court did not
whether to enter the venture, and if so, whether to opt in to a form with limited fiduciary duties or,
instead, in to a form with expansive fiduciary duties.
27. Johnston, supra note 1, at 295.
28. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
29. Johnston, supra note 1, at 330-32.
30. 359 P.2d at 43.
[Vol. 70:353
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stop there. It proceeded to advise the partners concerning the rights the
weaker partner enjoyed even though the partnership was at will:
A partner at will is not bound to remain in a partnership, regardless of
whether the business is profitable or unprofitable. A partner may not, how-
ever, by use of adverse pressure "freeze out" a co-partner and appropriate
the business to his own use. A partner may not dissolve a partnership to
gain the benefits of the business for himself, unless he fully compensates his
co-partner for his share of the prospective business opportunity....
[P]laintiff has the power to dissolve the partnership by express notice to
defendant. If, however, it is proved that plaintiff acted in bad faith and
violated his fiduciary duties by attempting to appropriate to his own use the
new prosperity of the partnership without adequate compensation to his co-
partner, the dissolution would be wrongful and the plaintiff would be liable
as provided by [UPA section 38(2)] for violation of the implied agreement
not to exclude defendant wrongfully from the partnership business
opportunity.3
1
Professor Johnston argues that the dicta in Page unduly expands the
stronger partner's fiduciary obligations and the reach of the wrongful dis-
solution provisions because the parties could have bargained for a defi-
nite term or a simple clause that the partnership would not be dissolved
until the partners had earned back their initial capital contributions.32
This criticism of Page reflects Professor Johnston's confusion about the
difference between identifying a gap and filling a gap. More specifically,
Johnston's criticism reflects both an interpretation of when contractual
gaps exist that is appropriate to short term, discrete transactions among
strangers, but not to long-term, relational contracts,33 and a misunder-
standing of the gap-filling signalling effect provided by venturers' choice
of organizational form.34
In effect, Johnston argues that by selecting at-will partnership form,
the partners have left no gaps concerning how the partners will adapt to
future contingencies. But from a relational-contract perspective, the
partners have not made substantive gap-filling decisions. Instead, they
have indicated both how gap-filing authority is allocated among the
partners and what the courts' general gap-filling role will be. In other
words, business firms and other relational contracts are very different
from the classical fully contingent contract in which each party fully
31. Id. at 44.
32. Johnston, supra note 1, at 331-32.
33. See supra note 6.
34. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
1992]
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specifies its substantive rights and duties at the outset. Indeed, the con-
tract between partners and shareholders in closely held firms is mostly
gaps. As long as the venture functions optimally, the partners or share-
holders themselves will fill these substantive gaps, in good faith, and as
the need arises. If, however, harmony ends, or in the worst case an op-
portunist strikes, the standard form rules, as modified by the parties' ex-
plicit contract, determine what adaptive or gap-filling rights the stronger
and weaker partners have, and what gap-filling role an efficiency-minded
court should play.35
As I interpret the Coasean Contract Theory, the Page court did two
very different things. First, it determined which organizational form the
venturers had selected-partnership at will or partnership for a specified
duration or undertaking. Then, after determining that the form selected
was an at-will partnership, the court commented on the gap-filling role
that the trial court should play if the weaker partner subsequently
complained about the stronger partner's conduct in dissolving the
partnership.
If the California Supreme Court had agreed with the trial court that
the Pages' venture was a partnership for a term, any premature dissolu-
tion would have been wrongful. In other words, there would not have
been a gap as to whether a particular dissolution was wrongful.36 How-
ever, once the supreme court determined that the partnership was at will,
it had to decide whether any dissolution would be non-wrongful or
35. Selection of partnership form indicates that future adaptations are to be made either by
collective consensus, or by one or more partners' withdrawal from the firm. As such adaptations
occur, substantive contractual gaps are filled. The court's role is to review such gap-filling actions
whenever any partner asks for an equitable accounting. For the signalling effect of corporate form
selection, see supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
36. Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) § 31(1) provides three circumstances in which a partner-
ship can be dissolved without violation of the partnership agreement: (1) by unanimous agreement of
the partners; (2) by the express will of any partner if the partnership is for no definite term or
undertaking; or (3) by the completion of any definite term or specified undertaking. UNIFORM
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(1) (1914). Under UPA § 31(2) a partnership may be dissolved in contra-
vention of the agreement at anytime by the express will of a partner. Id. § 31(2). Thus, if a court
determines that a partnership has an implied definite term or undertaking, and if the partnership is
nonetheless dissolved by the stronger partner, such dissolution is in contravention of the partnership
agreement and subjects the stronger partner to the gap-filling rules in UPA § 38. UPA § 38 favors
the non-wrongfully dissolving partner in two significant respects. First, the wrongfully dissolving
partner is liable for any damages to the other partner caused by the dissolution. Second, the
wronged partner has the option of continuing the business without the bad actor, or liquidating the
assets; in other words, the wronged partner is giveh near exclusive gap-filling authority concerning
the disposition of the partnership's assets. Id. § 38.
[Vol. 70:353"
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whether some subset of these dissolutions would be deemed wrongful as
a violation of implied fiduciary duties. The court in Page concluded that
there was a contractual gap as to which dissolutions of at-will partner-
ships were wrongful and which were not, and generally described those
that would be considered wrongful.
Under the Coasean Contract Theory as I understand it, the court's
ruling in Page was obviously correct. Rational prospective venturers
would have realized that a term-partnership provides the weaker partner
with greater protection against the stronger partner's opportunistic mis-
use of her dissolution power than does a partnership at will.3 7 Thus, in a
case like Page, an efficiency-minded court should not impose fiduciary
limits on the stronger Page's dissolution rights that are as severe as the
limits to which he would have been exposed if he prematurely dissolved a
partnership having an implied durational term.
Equally important, however, an efficiency-minded court should not
conclude that selection of a partnership at will means that any dissolu-
tion will be unconstrained by fiduciary duty. Selection of a partnership
at will would signal to a Coasean court that, in order to receive greater
adaptability, the partners were willing to endure a greater risk of oppor-
tunistic dissolution than would be the case if a term were specified, but it
does not suggest that no fiduciary protection is desired. To the contrary,
general partnership form has historically imposed fiduciary duties on
partners in a wide variety of circumstance. Moreover, if the Pages had
wished to provide each other with unconstrained withdrawal rights, they
could have organized as an implicit team,"8 or the weaker Page could
have been relegated to the status of lender. Thus, if the court in Page
declared that it would impose no implied fiduciary constraints on the
stronger partner's dissolution power under any circumstance, the court
would be acting in a value-reducing way by ignoring the venturers'
choice of partnership form with its implied fiduciary duty.
IV. CONCLUSION
Finally, I would like to comment briefly on Professor Johnston's fun-
damental assumptions about opportunism as a human characteristic and
37. Indeed, as Professor Johnston notes, the Page brothers were apparently aware of this differ-
ence because they bargained for duration in an earlier and separate partnership venture. See Page v.
Page, 359 P.2d 41, 43 (Cal. 1961).
38. An implicit team is bound together by a web of mutual expectations and interests none of
which is embodied in a legally enforceable contract.
1992]
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about the significance of game theory analysis. Johnston posits that pro-
spective venturers are of two types-opportunists and nonopportunists.
He asserts that a major reason weaker investors are exploited ex post lies
in their inability to determine ex ante whether the prospective stronger
venturer is and will be an opportunist. Conversely, a major concern for
nonopportunistic stronger venturers is their inability to determine
whether a prospective weaker venturer will use fiduciary protection
opportunistically.
While analytical clarity is enhanced by identifying as many aspects of
the contracting problem investors face in cooperative ventures as possi-
ble, I do not think Johnston has made a convincing case for the factors
he identifies. It seems likely to me that confirmed opportunists will grav-
itate to short term, discrete transactions, in which exploitation can occur
before the opportunist's true character is revealed. Moreover, Johnston's
assumption, that whether individuals are opportunists will be determined
outside of the venture and despite how it is organized, is most likely true
in short term, discrete transactions, and less true the more interdepen-
dent and enduring the relation. Thus, it seems that Professor Johnston's
gap-filling theory will be most useful in connection with one shot, short-
term ventures that are very similar to the classical discrete transactions
between strangers (the stuff of the first-year contracts course), and of de-
cidedly less importance in cases like Meiselman v. Meiselman, Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. ,40 or Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home.
41 If
my intuition is correct, then it also seems that the greatest shortcoming
of current scholarship concerning closely held cooperative ventures is not
the lack of game-theory analysis but, instead, the absence of systematic
and sustained attention to the teachings of transaction-cost economists
and relational contract theorists.
39. 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983).
40. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
41. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976).
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